

Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force

**A Monograph
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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force

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Abstract

Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force.
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This monograph analyzed whether or not the current joint command and control system in place is sufficient for the rapidly changing contemporary operating environment. The end of the Cold War has not brought the worldwide stability that many thought would ensue, rather the dynamic environment facing the United States in the twenty-first century has created an environment far more likely to rely upon the military to respond to emerging crises and assist shaping foreign policy. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 laid the foundation for many of the military reforms witnessed during the final decade of the twentieth century, but at the operational level many of the same problems encountered before the Goldwater-Nichols Act are still prevalent during current military operations.

This monograph reviewed the establishment of three Joint Task Forces: JTF 120 commanding OPERATION URGENT FURY in Grenada, JTF Guardian Assistance, the humanitarian relief operation to Central Africa, and JTF Noble Anvil in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE and contrasted them with the ongoing experimentation being conducted by the United States Joint Forces Command for Standing Joint Task Force headquarters. All three of these JTFs experienced initial problems during the establishment of the JTF, resulting in problems during the execution phases of the operation. Three of the characteristics of operational art from Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, were used to evaluate the research question: Does the United States need to establish Standing Joint Task Forces to meet its security needs in the twenty-first century? The characteristics used in this assessment were synergy, anticipation, and timing and tempo. The monograph concluded that the model identified by Joint Forces Command of placing a standing Joint Force Headquarters within the staff of each regional CINC would provide a rapid and decisive response to an emerging crisis and provide the best means of executing operational art during the initial phases of our next military campaign.

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Introduction

A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peacetime maneuvers shall be comrades in war... From cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity.

Ardant du Picq in Battle Studies¹

More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first battle problem is the weakness of command and control.... inadequate preparation of commanders and staffs for the real world of combat.

John Shy in First Battles²

The political and strategic environment facing a nation will often dictate how its military institutions view their current operational setting and the need for change within their organizations. During the last half of the twentieth century, the United States focused on building a military force capable of thwarting the advance of communism around the world. The establishment of numerous army divisions, air force fighter and bomber wings and naval ships was an action to counter the threat we envisioned fighting. With the diminished threat from the former Soviet Union, the United States has adopted a more open foreign policy. The latest National Security Strategy, signed during the Clinton Administration, endorsed the use of the military to protect not only vital national interests, but also to intervene for humanitarian and other interests.³ President Bush's Secretary of Defense further expanded the concept of having the military capable of operating across the full spectrum by outlining other asymmetric threats facing the country that the military must prepare for, such as terrorism, cyberattacks, and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.⁴ The expanded use of the military for operations across the full spectrum of conflict demands that the force be ready to react and integrate into the strategic setting needed to shape the country's foreign policy. This raises the

¹ Ardant du Picq, Colonel French Army, *Battle Studies*, translated by COL. John N. Greely, USA and MAJ. Robert C. Cotton, USA, *Battle Studies*, (Harrisburg, P.A.: Military Service Publishing Co, 1946), 96.

² John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect", *America's First Battles: 1776 – 1965*, edited by Charles E. Heller and William A Stofft, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 328-330.

³ President Bill Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), 1.

question of whether or not our current military structure and its imbedded command and control apparatus are capable of rapidly responding to the needs of the President.

The dawn of the twenty-first century has brought a new reality of what future war may look like. No longer are the United States and the other NATO countries locked in a power struggle with the Warsaw Pact countries on the plains of Europe. As the lone superpower in the world, the arena in which the United States military was used to operating has changed significantly. Many of the state, non-state, and transnational actors that were held at bay due to the divided, bipolar nature of the world from the late 1940s until the early 1990s have now emerged in prominence and are seeking a larger role on the international stage. Religious, cultural, and ethnic frictions will continue to be at the heart of the many border and internal conflicts during the next decade. The potential for increasing instability around the world and the development of new flashpoints is further complicated by the continual depletion of natural resources, scarcity of water, pollution and the potential for many of the developing world governments to fail due to their inability to meet the needs of their populations.⁵

Without a peer competitor on the battlefield, the United States military in the late 1990s attempted to transform itself into a force that is capable of operating across a full spectrum of operations. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, specifically addresses the need to have army forces prepared to conduct not only decisive offensive and defensive operations, but also prepared to conduct stability and support type missions.⁶ Recent operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and on-going missions in the Middle East demonstrate the need to have forces prepared to operate under a variety of scenarios. These operations exhibit the need for a capable joint force, integrated and trained to produce the synergy desired by the commanders in the field.

⁴ Agency Group 9, *Making Sense of Transformation*, FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, June 21, 2001.

⁵ TRADOC DCSINT, *White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: CAC Threat Support Directorate, 2000), 3.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army. FM 3-0 Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001). 1-14 – 1-16.

Faced with an ever-increasing variety of missions, military transformation in the coming decade must continue to capitalize on the technological asymmetry currently enjoyed by the United States in order to provide options for the President as he attempts to shape foreign policy and remain engaged worldwide. Adversaries attempting to challenge the United States are unlikely to match it with firepower alone, but are more likely to attempt to counter the technology overmatch by using unconventional means, such as fighting within cities or using chemical or biological weapons. As we prepare to face our next adversary, we must look to conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, Chechnya, or Afghanistan for the pertinent lessons learned about the face of modern warfare. Utilizing our technology overmatch, the United States military must continue to develop the means to counter enemy advantages during initial phases of future operations. The current asymmetrical advantages enjoyed by the United States such as superior mobility, operational speed and maneuver, improved situational understanding through superior intelligence, information operations, synergy between the services, and precision strike are likely to be critical as we enter a new era and strive to continue to dominate the changing nature of battle, while dictating timing and tempo of dispersed operations.⁷

With a force that is only a fraction of its 1990 size, the frequency with which the United States government has called upon the military to help shape its foreign policy and respond to crises as they develop around the world has significantly increased. During the entire Cold War period from 1947 – 1989, the United States government deployed the military sixteen times to respond to worldwide contingencies. In the following decade from 1989 to 1997, the military responded forty-five times to worldwide contingencies ranging across the full spectrum.⁸ In “Leaping Ahead to the 21st Century” General Reimer argues for developing a more joint culture

⁷ Steven Metz, “*Strategic Asymmetry*”, *Military Review*, Jul / Aug 2001, Vol. 81, Issue 4, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001), 23. and Huba Wass de Czege, BG, U.S. Army, Ret., *New Paradigm Tactics and Tactical Organizations: How to think about designing and fighting Future Combat System based tactical organizations*, (October, 2001), 5-7.

⁸ Mark E. Vinson, “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness”, *Parameters*, (Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXX, No. 2, Summer 2000), 21-23.

since the vast majority of contingencies during the last decade were joint operations. This trend in the conduct of military operations clearly demonstrates that single service operations are now part of history and that if we are to continue to dominate the rapidly changing environment in which we operate, a joint approach to contingency planning from the onset of the crisis will be critical to success in the future.⁹

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 set in motion reforms to reorganize the Department of Defense, making it more responsive and increasing the effectiveness of military operations. Not only did this Act seek to strengthen civilian control over the military and improve the military advice given to civilian leadership, it also sought to improve the military's strategy formulation process and ability to plan for contingencies. Unified Commanders now have specific responsibilities for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their specific area of operation. This authority and responsibility now surpass that of the individual service representatives, providing the necessary requirement for the creation of a joint approach to future missions.¹⁰ With the development of joint doctrine outlining the employment of forces, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces by creating the synergy desired between the separate services to increase the overall military effectiveness. The creation of synergy happens only through the effective integration of available assets from all services into a joint force.¹¹

With the overall responsibility for operations within their theater, the CINCs tend to operate at the strategic level in order to implement and shape the foreign policy and synchronize actions between services. Our current doctrine enables these commanders the ability to establish Joint Task Forces to conduct operational level missions. After the completion

⁹ Dennis J. Reimer, General, "Leaping Ahead to the 21st Century", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: JFQ, Autumn / Winter 1997 – 98) 22.

¹⁰ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), vii. and James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Autumn 1996), 10-15.

of a particular mission, these ad hoc JTFs usually dissolve.¹² Since most JTFs are not permanent fixtures within our military organizations, but formed as a response to a developing crisis, the question of this monograph emerges. Does the United States military need to establish Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTF) to meet its security needs in the twenty-first century?

Fighting as a joint team in this new and uncertain world is only part of the solution to developing a more capable and responsive military force. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the emergence of regional powers that continue to threaten United States interests at home and abroad, and the continual humanitarian missions demand that the military develop and transform in order to provide the type of force required by the nation. Military and civilian leaders must realize that the current operational environment facing the United States has significantly compressed the time affecting force projection. The luxury of easing into a developing crisis, methodically deciding on a course of action, waiting for diplomatic and economic measures to attempt to remedy the situation, then finally assigning a headquarters, and assembling the required forces may be unrealistic in many of the future conflicts. Rather, a command and control headquarters must be able to anticipate the crisis, participate in the crisis-action planning, understand the desired strategic effects and end states, be capable of creating synergy between the services from the onset of operations, while controlling the operation's timing and tempo. In essence, the JTF of tomorrow will have to be more able to execute operational art from the onset of a crisis than previous JTFs.

The employment of operational art in the future by either a JTF or SJTF will be critical to achieve the political, strategic, and operational effects desired. In an effort to examine the capabilities of the current ad hoc JTFs, the second section of the paper examines three case studies in which operational level crises mandated the use of a JTF. Two large scale operations were examined, one prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: the invasion of Grenada, and

¹¹ Lovelace, 48.

one after it, JTF Noble Anvil during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo. The third case study examined is a small-scale humanitarian aid mission to Central Africa, JTF Guardian Assistance. In each operation, the time interval between the establishment of the JTF and execution of the mission was relatively short. All three operations were eventually successful, but all experienced many of the same hurdles during the initial phases of the operation. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the ongoing experimentation with Joint Force Headquarters.

The third section of this paper examines operational art and its application to current and future operations. The examination of the theory of operational art and its application to the time – space dilemma faced by previous commanders is contrasted with the current dilemma faced by commanders operating in the existing contemporary operational environment. In the near future, the United States is not likely to face an enemy willing to fight another conventional war as fought by the Iraqis during Desert Storm, but will attempt to fight using asymmetric means. The use of weapons of mass destruction, denial of lodgment areas, more integrated air defense systems, and the use of special force type units against softer targets will likely be the norm. Designing a campaign around the elements of operational art is as critical today as it was fifty years ago.

The fourth section of this paper assesses the differences in effectiveness between the ad hoc JTFs used in each of the three case studies and the Joint Force Headquarters under development by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The criteria used to assess the validity of the research are developed from some of the characteristics of operational art as outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. After examining the eleven facets used to describe operational art in Joint Publication 3-0, I felt that synergy, anticipation, timing and tempo were the most critical characteristics during the initial phases of any operation

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), II-13.

and would be the most useful when examining the current ad hoc nature in which JTFs are currently formed and the model envisioned by USJFCOM. Can the SJTF integrate and synchronize joint operations across the theater better than an ad hoc JTF, creating the synergistic effect between the services desired by the commander? Can a SJTF better anticipate the needs of a Unified Commander and integrate better into the Theater Engagement Plan? Can a SJTF conduct initial operations at a tempo exceeding those of an ad hoc JTF, making them more responsive and capable of meeting the needs of the regional commander?¹³

The final section of this paper contains recommendations concerning the implementation of Standing Joint Task Forces. The recommendations will include a structure for the future SJTF and the role it could play in future contingencies. Furthermore, future exercises conducted by USJFCOM must continue to refine the capabilities needed within this headquarters and exercise it annually to ensure that it is prepared for eventual use in an emerging contingency. The ability to execute operational art will be the critical test for any recommendations concerning the proposal of a Joint Force Headquarters.

¹³ Ibid., x – xi.

The Joint Task Force

The integration of core competencies provided by the individual Services is essential to the joint team, and the employment of the capabilities of the Total Force (active, reserve, guard, and civilian members) increases the options for the commander and complicates the choices of our opponents.

*Joint Vision 2020*¹⁴

The 1995 version of the National Military Strategy states, “Being ready to fight and win the nations wars remains our foremost responsibility and the prime consideration governing all military activities.”¹⁵ Yet, even with this underlying focus, the different services retain numerous redundant and often inoperable systems making operating within a joint force difficult. With the United States military not expected to expand in the future and having to rely on its power projection capabilities to respond to future crises, military leaders will continue to struggle to find the best use of available resources. Transforming the current version of the Joint Task Force may provide a means of gaining a greater return on the investment provided by the military.

By their very nature, military institutions have often been resistant to change, even when faced with a changing operational environment. Retired General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978-1982, makes the assessment that the United States military has often been unprepared at the onset of each new war primarily due to its resistance to change demonstrated prior to it. Clinging to the past and the failure to make a rigorous examination of defense requirements has often led to initial failures and caused the military to reorganize while the conflict is ongoing, instead of entering the conflict fully prepared. Yet, in most cases we have prevailed; not necessarily, because we better executed operational art, but often because we were bigger and could wear down the adversary.¹⁶

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020, The American Military Preparing for Tomorrow*, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 2.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy*, (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 1.

¹⁶ David C. Jones, General, “Past Organizational Problems” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, (Fort McNair: National Defense University, 1996) 23-24.

While history provides numerous examples to support General Jones's claims, the United States military has taken a different approach during the final decade of the twentieth century in order to actively prepare for the next conflict. As the United States enters the 21st Century as the lone superpower, with the experience of recent conflicts such as Desert Storm, Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, we have closely examined how we envision operating in the contemporary operating environment and have begun to refine our doctrine and reorganize our military institutions to support that doctrine. For example, the United States Army recently revised their battlefield organization to take into account the changing nature of the non-contiguous battlefield. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations outlined in FM 3-0, Operations replace the deep, close, and rear operations envisioned in the latest FM 100-5.¹⁷ In addition, the development of the IBCT provides the military the ability to operate in a non-contiguous environment better than legacy forces currently in use.

If the United States is to remain engaged worldwide to protect and advance its national interests: ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, honoring international commitments and contributing to economic well-being, the military may not have the luxury of taking a methodical approach to wearing down an adversary, but may have to accomplish the mission rapidly and decisively.¹⁸ Our ability to dictate the tempo of operations and the terms in which we fight will be some of the criteria for successful execution of future operations. The military's ability to seize the operational and strategic initiative, while at the same time preventing the enemy from accomplishing his objectives and reducing his options characterize the decisive environment the United States military envisions operating in the future.¹⁹ The Joint Experimentation conducted by the USJFCOM may provide the means that enable decisive action across the full spectrum of conflict required by both military and civilian leaders.

¹⁷ FM 3-0, Operations, 4-22 – 4-24.

¹⁸ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), 2.

In the past few years, United States Joint Forces Command has examined some of the past operational problems experienced during war fighting. The establishment of Joint Task Forces and their ability to fully integrate into a rapidly developing crisis is one area of concern for the military leadership. With the Unified Commanders responsible for the entire theater, they support ongoing regional operations by providing by forces and resources to a subordinate commander responsible for a particular operation within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). Specific, limited military operations requiring a joint headquarters, call for the establishment of a Joint Task Force to exercise operational control. After completion of the specific operation, the proper authority dissolves the established JTF.²⁰ Joint doctrine authorizes the augmentation of additional representatives from the component commands in order to ensure the functionality of these ad hoc JTFs. For example, United States European Command (USEUCOM) has designated a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTCAC) designed to bring joint experience and expertise to a service-based JTF. This USEUCOM DJTFAC is comprised of 29 personnel, who are battle rostered and trained during JTF exercises.²¹

Functionality, flexibility, service integration, synergy, and responsiveness are not normally developed by merely augmenting a staff with additional key personnel, but rather are produced over time with training and a full understanding of the unit organization, its capabilities, and how it operates in relationship to higher headquarters and other agencies. Flexibility, responsiveness, and integration of assigned units to gain the desired strategic end state results from being part of crisis action planning from the start of the operation. Several past operations provide a means to examine the operational difficulties that must be overcome if the United

¹⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, J9 Joint Futures Lab. *A Concept For Rapid Decisive Operations*, (9 August 2001), 8.

²⁰ LTC Mark W. Clay, *The Standing Joint Task Force: A Doctrinal Imperative*, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2000), 2-4.

²¹ *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, II-13. and United States European Command Directive 55-11, *JTF HQ Policies, Procedures, and Organization*, (http://www.eucom.smil/eccs-or/library/uscinceur/DirectiveSystem/ED_55-11, 6 December 2001), 28-1.

States is going to remain the sole superpower capable of effective worldwide response to developing crises.

Grenada

OPERATION URGENT FURY, the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, was conducted in response to the militant Marxist overthrow of the government and subsequent execution of Prime Minister Bishop and members of his cabinet on 19 October. In response to this developing crisis, CINCLANT established JTF 120 under the command of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf to oversee the planning and execution of military operations. The objectives for Operation Urgent Fury were to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals, neutralize Grenadain forces, stabilize the internal situation to maintain peace and assist in the restoration of the democratic government.²²

In a matter of three days, JTF 120 had accomplished most of its objectives on Grenada but many things went wrong from the start of the planning through its execution. In the first major U.S. military operation since Vietnam, planners on the JTF 120 staff were required from the beginning of the operations to include units from all services in this relatively small contingency area. JTF 120 was established just forty-eight hours before the set invasion time and the primarily naval staff lacked much of the expertise needed to plan an invasion consisting of primarily ground forces from the Army and Marine Corps. Before the emergence of this contingency, CINCLANT's primary focus had been on maintaining the sea lines of communication with Europe. The initial lack of both joint land and air component commanders on the USS Guam complicated planning and prevented complete integration and coordination between the services. The subsequent insertion of MG Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the

²² Dorothea Cypher, "Urgent Fury: The U.S. Army in Grenada", edited by Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, *American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury"*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 99-102.

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to act as the deputy commander would alleviate some of the problems.

The ad hoc nature in which the JTF was established prevented the commander from creating synergy between the services. Due to communication limitations with and between the services and the potential for fratricide, planners divided the island of Grenada in two, with the Marines operating in the north and the Army operating in the south. Lack of intelligence in the area of operations complicated tactical operations, causing deployed units to have to rely on civilian maps to coordinate between services. The lack of a fully integrated staff from the start of operations left some of the attached units, such as the Rangers and the 82nd ABN Division unsure of their roles and objectives in the invasion. This confusion during the planning process was compounded later during execution, causing the 82nd ABN Division to attack more tentatively across their sector resulting in a separation between themselves and the faster paced Marines to their north. Further lack of coordination between the services, caused unnecessary casualties when a Navy A-7 bombed a mental hospital and a air-naval gunfire liaison company failed to coordinate with the 82nd ABN DIV, accidentally attacking a brigade headquarters, wounding seventeen soldiers.²³

Operation Guardian Assistance

Despite the lessons learned from OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM requiring a military force that operates in synchronized joint manner, operations during the final decade of the twentieth century demonstrate the need for further joint transformation if the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are going to completely materialize. Smaller-scale contingencies involving humanitarian assistance demonstrate that, despite the scale of the operations, the requirement for a joint approach to the contingency will enhance the desired end

²³ Ronald H. Cole, "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 98 / Winter 99, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1999), 57-59. and

state. JTF Guardian Assistance (GA) involved the deployment of approximately 400 soldiers from EUCOM in November and December 1996 to Central Africa to participate in the refugee crisis in East Zaire and Rwanda. The conflict in this region had been brewing for years, with rivalries between the Tutsis and the Hutus continuing to escalate. In 1994, this feuding led to the massacre of over 500,000 moderate Hutus and Tutsis and the displacement of one million refugees. In 1996, violence again escalated with attacks against the Tutsis living in the Eastern Zairian Plateau.²⁴

On 1 November 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a planning directive to EUCOM to facilitate the tactical planning for humanitarian assistance operations and voluntary repatriation of refugees from East Zaire to Rwanda. USASETAF received the mission, commanded by MG E.P. Smith who would later command JTF GA during execution of the operation. During the initial planning from 4-13 Nov, USASETAF originally estimated a force of approximately 3000, including security forces and a forcible-entry capability. The original task organization for the operation was service component organized to include an AFFOR, ARFOR, JPOTF, and JSOTF. As a result of further concept development, this task organization was refined and reduced to the smallest number of personnel actually needed in the theater to accomplish the mission, reducing the initial force from the 3000 estimated during mission analysis to 400.²⁵

The after-action review pointed out some significant problems this JTF had to overcome during the execution of its mission. A rapidly changing environment complicated by simultaneous planning and execution, characterized JTF GA operations. The staff also coordinated with numerous multi-national humanitarian relief organizations and contended with

“Operation Urgent Fury”, *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, Joint Electronic Library*, 15 July 1997, III-1 – III-8.

²⁴ *EUCOM Operation Guardian Assistance After Action Review*, (<http://jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil/Other/AARs/Guardass.htm>), 21 August 2001, 7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-13.

the multitude of varying objectives each brought with them. This type of planning, although not unique to the military, was complicated when the ad hoc organization, built for this specific mission, failed to receive its anticipated level of support. Although routine training conducted within EUCOM exercises enhanced SEATAF's capabilities, the "augmentation plug" received from EUCOM was not sufficient for the operation and reduced some of their capabilities. Unfortunately for this JTF, the augmentation support received for the planning effort were individuals from respective component commands tasked on an ad hoc basis and were not designated to join the JTF upon activation and deployment. Very few members of the trained team organized for JTF certification a few months earlier were the actual members participating in the operation.²⁶

Flexibility and integration into the strategic plan and the nesting of objectives was further complicated during the initial phase of the operation by the lack of communications platforms for the JTF HQs, the lack of SOPs within all staff sections, trouble integrating JTF GA operations into those of EUCOM, and the lack of intelligence fed to the JTF. These shortfalls during the initial phase caused the JTF to develop courses of action and force packages that did not mirror the objectives and situation envisioned by their higher headquarters.²⁷

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil

In 1999, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE conducted offensive military operations against Yugoslav forces under the control of President Milosevic. The ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population in Kosovo and the Serbian desire to destroy the Kosovar Liberation Army prompted NATO to launch offensive military operations. On 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air operations against Serbian military forces, seeking to achieve the following objectives:

1. Stop all military action and end the violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Withdrawal of Serbian military, para-military, and police forces from Kosovo.

²⁶ Ibid., 14-20.

3. Agreement to the presence on an international military force.
4. Safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
5. Provide creditable willingness to work based on the Rambouillet Accords.²⁸

In order to prepare for the possibility of military action against Yugoslavia, General Clark, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, established two JTFs in August 1998 to conduct the initial planning for any future operations. Vice Admiral Dan Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet would command JTF Flexible Anvil with the mission to plan for and possibly execute a limited strike against Yugoslavian military targets using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. The Commander, 16th Air Force LTG Short would command JTF Sky Anvil with the mission to develop and possibly execute a more extensive strike option if the original limited strike failed to achieve the desired objectives. Although designated as JTFs, both organizations were composed of personnel primarily from their parent service and neither JTF planning option considered the use of ground forces during the operation. Both of these JTFs deactivated in December 1998.²⁹

With a conflict looming on the horizon, General Clark established JTF Noble Anvil commanded by Admiral Ellis, in late January 1999. This JTF staff was comprised primarily of personnel assigned to the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. Although designated as a possible JTF HQs according to USEUCOM Directive 55-11, the nature in which this headquarters was established resulted in similar problems suffered by the previously mentioned JTF headquarters. Established just a month before the commencement of ALLIED FORCE, the JTF staff struggled to implement fully the previous planning conducted by the now defunct JTFs Flexible Anvil and

²⁷ Ibid., 20-23.

²⁸ *Operation Allied Force, Operation Noble Anvil*, (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/allied_force.htm), 6 September 2001, 1.

²⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Report to Congress: Kosovo / Operation Allied Force Afteraction Report*, Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2000, 17-19.

Sky Anvil. The staff assigned to this new headquarters was now responsible for executing a plan they had limited involvement with during development.³⁰

Admiral Ellis further elaborates on the problems experienced during the Kosovo campaign with the establishment of the ad hoc JTF Noble Anvil in his briefing “A View from the Top”. The lack of adequate component staffing, such as a ground component commander, eliminated opportunities for the development of a coherent campaign plan. The conduct of a single dimensional campaign meant that deception, diversion, and feint opportunities were lost. Not being established until just prior to the operation commencing limited the capabilities of this headquarters. Throughout the duration of the operation, JTF Noble Anvil lacked sufficient facilities and command and control platforms to plan and control this type of operation. The lack of a trained JTF staff was further compounded by not being part of the initial planning during JTFs Flexible Anvil and Sky Anvil, resulting in the failure to fully develop branches and sequels to the base plan and not being fully prepared with a complete target list to start the air campaign.³¹

United States Joint Forces Command Experimentation

As a result of the failure of the 1979 Iranian Hostage Rescue attempt and the problems experienced during the 1983 invasion of Grenada, the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act emerged as an attempt to remedy the lack of interoperability between the services within the United States military. Although it greatly enhanced our abilities at the strategic level, there is evidence of certain shortfalls at the operational level. Unified Commanders continue to establish ad hoc JTFs in much the same way they did twenty years ago, fully knowing that these organizations are often ill-staffed and trained to conduct the operational level contingency planning required for mission execution during an actual contingency. Many of the same trends identified during the 1983 Invasion of Grenada with JTF 120 were evident almost twenty years later in both JTF Guardian

³⁰ J. Stephen Hoefel, *U.S. Joint Task Force in the Kosovo Conflict*, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2000), 8-10.

³¹ Admiral James O. Ellis, U.S. Navy, *A View From the Top*, (United States Naval Forces Europe, 1999),

Assistance and JTF Noble Anvil. The ad hoc JTF headquarters were each attempting to form a command element, simultaneously conducting crisis action planning and absorbing the required forces for the operation.

In an attempt to remedy some of the shortcomings identified during earlier operations, many of the CINCs designated headquarters for JTFs in the event of a future crisis. Standard operating procedures augment these headquarters with additional trained personnel to provide the expertise needed to tie into the overarching strategic plan and provide the necessary skills to operate in the joint arena. For example, USEUCOM Directive 55-11 pre-designates six headquarters as possible JTFs: V Corps, SETAF, USAFE, NAVEUR, SOCEUR, and USEUCOM. These headquarters would receive a 29-man augmentation cell (NAVEUR would receive a 30-man cell) to assist them in the establishment of the JTF, communicate back to higher headquarters, and assist in the planning.³² The other unified commands have similar procedures in place. The PACOM pre-designated JTFs were I Corps, 7th Fleet, III Marine Expeditionary Force, Alaskan Command, 3rd Fleet, and 13th Air Force. SOUTHCOM pre-designated II Marine Expeditionary Force. Much of the daily operations of these headquarters concern the training of their respective units and not manning the potential joint headquarters. These potential JTFs do not exist except for designated training events.³³ Realizing the inherent shortfalls with the current system, USJFCOM has developed a series of exercises to test the validity of some of the experimental concepts.

Joint experimentation is about the transformation of the military through the development, exploration, and assessment of new concepts, structures, and techniques that would enhance the joint force. In an effort to focus ongoing experimentation, USJFCOM has developed a concept known as Rapid, Decisive Operations.

6-8.

³² USEUCOM Directive 55-11, 28-1 – 28-3.

³³ D. Robert Worley, *Challenges to Train, Organize, and Equip the Complete Combined Arms Team: The Joint Task Force*, (Alexandria, VA.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1998), 7-8.

A concept to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy's ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, decision, and mobility for the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock, defeating his ability and will to fight.³⁴

Armed with the vision of future joint capabilities as outlined in JV 2010 and JV 2020 and the concept of Rapid, Decisive Operations, USJFCOM has developed a series of exercises through 2004 to test some of the emerging concepts that would enhance future joint operations. Embedded into these exercises is the concept of a permanent Joint Forces Headquarters. This Joint Force Headquarters fully embedded in every regional CINC HQs and immersed in the Theater Engagement Plan for that particular AOR, provide options for the CINC as he attempts to shape actions within the theater. This rapidly deployable headquarters provides the capability of possibly deterring conflict or coercing an adversary without actual combat operations. It also provides a headquarters to coordinate a smaller scale contingency that requires rapid action.³⁵ Unified Vision 01 (UV01) was the first in the series of exercises, conducted in May 2001. This computer driven exercise was one of the building blocks for future exercises, Millennium Challenge 2002 and Olympic Challenge 2004. Among the numerous objectives for UV-01 was to examine the Joint Force Headquarters organization, to include external relationships with other agencies and headquarters. USJFCOM designed this exercise to examine the structure of future joint war-fighting headquarters and how emerging technologies could enhance performance over the ad hoc organizations currently used.³⁶ The refinement of the Joint Force Headquarters concept and the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the employment of it are among the objectives of Millennium Challenge 02. Olympic Challenge 2004 will be looking at potential joint forces and

³⁴ Otto Kreisher, "The Quest for Jointness", *Air Force Magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association*, September 2001, Vol. 84, No. 9), 4.

³⁵ United States Joint Forces Command, *Unified Vision 2001, Rapid, Decisive Operations in 2007, Joint Concept Refinement Experiment, Quick Look Report*, July 2001, 5-8.

³⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, *Unified Vision 01*, (<http://www.acom.mil/About/experiments/uv01.htm>), 17 October 2001), 1.

capabilities not yet fielded to find the optimum mix of joint capabilities for the decade starting in 2010.³⁷

One of the numerous benefits envisioned from the development of JF HQs are their ability to conduct parallel planning, compressing the crisis action planning process enabling better anticipation of the needs of the CINC and be responsive to the changing environment of an emerging crisis. According to Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, during Crisis Action Planning, a JTF is established before or during Phase III (COA Development) in order to allow for the maximum staff integration and participation with the higher headquarters planning process.³⁸ Unfortunately, as we have seen from the previous examples within this paper, the time between the emergence of the crisis to military intervention maybe relatively short. An ad hoc JTF, not yet established during Phases I and II of the Crisis Action Planning process would inherently be less prepared at the onset of operations and contribute less to planning. The Joint Interactive Planning process proposed because of the experimentation conducted during UV-01, envisions a future JF HQs operating within each regional CINCs headquarters. This JF HQs would integrate into planning from the onset of the crisis, making it more responsive when given the order to execute.³⁹

The decisive conduct of operations envisioned by CINCs results from the ability of subordinate headquarters to completely integrated into the Theater Engagement Plan before the onset of an emerging crisis. The interactive planning process allows theses previously established JF HQs the ability to better anticipate the changing nature of the environment and dictate the tempo and timing of operations from receipt of mission due to their involvement in the planning

³⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate, Joint Futures Lab, *Olympic Challenge 2004*, (<http://home.je.jfcom.mil/PAOFactSHT/OC04.htm>), 17 October 2001), 1.

³⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Forces Planning Guidance and Procedures*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 13 January 1999), IX-5 and Unified Vision 2001, Rapid, Decisive Operations in 2007, Joint Concept Refinement Experimentation, Quick Look Report, July 2001, 26.

³⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, *Unified Vision 2001, Rapid, Decisive Operations in 2007, Joint Concept Refinement Experiment, Quick Look Report*, July 2001, 23.

process from the beginning. The creation of synergy through the integration and synchronization of available assets from all services and government agencies allows for the development of operational art. The rapid, flexible, and integrated response envisioned by USJFCOM experimentation should better enable the standing JF HQs the ability to employ force through the execution of simultaneous actions throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Operational Art

The idea that obtains the victory is a creative product, and as such, it is art. Its fulfillment, execution in battle, is only the external expression of the idea. The military leader, who is the generator of this type of creative idea, is an artist in the truest sense and it is on the battlefield that his talents find supreme expression.

*Colonel James Mrazek in The Art of Winning War*⁴⁰

Canvas, paint, and brushes, each by itself are of little value to an artist, but together they have the possibility to represent the future. The idea of the artist comes to life through the collective use of his tools and the application of his talents, to create the external expression of an idea. Rembrandt, Picasso, and other great artists created beauty by expressing their vision onto a canvas for world to see. The battlefield represents the military leader's canvas and onto it, he must portray his vision to the world. The military leader of tomorrow faces a similar challenge as he attempts to effectively combine his available tools and knowledge into a coherent expression of his vision. Not only straddled with the dual requirements to deploy great distances and assemble a superior force, the military commander must envision how he will incorporate all enablers of military power to achieve the desired end state to the campaign.

Simon Naveh's quotation of Henry Kissinger best sums up the problem confronting the military artist of today as he attempts to operate in the dynamic environment of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century: "In the past the major problem of strategists was to assemble a superior strength. In the contemporary period, the problem more frequently is how to discipline the available power into some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute".⁴¹ The military artist of today is not only challenged to incorporate the traditional concepts of firepower and maneuver but also must examine how to incorporate the concepts of joint operations, operational maneuver from strategic distance, precision strike munitions, reach-back capabilities for intelligence and logistics, improved situational understanding, information operations, and the

⁴⁰ James Mrazek, *The Art of Winning Wars*, (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), 122.

⁴¹ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishing, 2000), 2.

ever more present media. Military leadership must incorporate these concepts into the campaign plan, while at the same time seeking the rapid and decisive conclusion to the operation.

If the object of war is to impose our will upon the enemy, how should the United States military seek to accomplish that objective when the environment in which it operates is rapidly changing due to the proliferation of technology employed on the battlefield, the dispersed and varying types of locations of potential crises, and the speed with which initial operations are taking place? The art by which the military leader employs his forces in tomorrow's conflict may be vastly different than that previously used when the enemy resembled and fought in basically the same conventional manner as the armed forces of the United States.

Joint doctrine defines operational art as "the employment of military force to attain strategic and / or operational objectives through design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war."⁴² This art is the link by which the commander ties the strategic level objectives and the actual efficient and effective employment of force. This linking of strategic objectives to resources prevents commanders from using resources to fight individual, unrelated engagements. It requires the commander to view the mission in terms of operational design: ends, ways, and means.

1. What military conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
3. How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?⁴³

⁴² Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 23 March 1994, as Amended Through 10 January 2000, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 344.

⁴³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, (Joint Electronic Library, 16 July 1997), 562.

During the Cold War, the United States military had a threat based doctrine, designing force structure capable of defeating the most likely threats that we envisioned fighting at the time: the Soviet Union and later North Korea. With the downfall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of other rogue nations, terrorist organizations, and other international actors has caused the United States to review its doctrine currently in use, ensuring that it accurately represents the likely threats. With an enemy that is less predictable than the Soviet model previously encountered and that may lack a formal organizational structure, the application of force at the decisive point in time will challenge commanders and planners. Attacking an enemy center of gravity may be elusive if the enemy fails to establish himself on the battlefield as the Iraqi Republican Guard did during the Persian Gulf War, but rather acts as a terrorist organizations operating across country boundaries and lacking a clearly defined and rigid organizational structure.

Imposing one's will on an enemy force causes a military commander to think of a campaign in terms of time and space. Where on the battlefield can friendly forces mass to overwhelm the enemy physically and mentally creating the conditions for the successful conclusion of the operation? What tempo and speed is most conducive for attacking the enemy center of gravity, causing the enemy to culminate? How does the modern force mass in terms of time and space, to simultaneously attack dispersed targets, while ensuring initial actions set the conditions for sequential operations and the risk to friendly forces is mitigated?

As Clausewitz states, "to overcome the enemy, one must match your effort against his power of resistance."⁴⁴ No longer measured in months or years, but rather in weeks and days or even hours, the time-space continuum viewed by military commanders for centuries has changed significantly since the age of Frederick the Great or Napoleon. With the advent of new technologies during the nineteenth century, the pace and breadth of operations significantly

⁴⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.

changed how campaigns were fought and how leaders viewed the battlefield. Dr. James Schneider states that innovations developed during the Industrial Revolution ushered in the significant changes at the operational level. The railroad, telegraph, and the modern market infrastructure laid the foundation for larger armies, distributed operations, and the ability to sustain a military force indefinitely.⁴⁵ These innovations no longer permitted the military commander to observe the entire battlefield and orchestrate all actions in detail.

The railroad completely changed the nature of warfare. It was fully capable of supporting million-man armies and due to its speed; it eventually reduced the advantage of interior lines of communication that the Confederacy had enjoyed during the early years of the American Civil War. By 1864, Union armies were advancing on multiple fronts by way of the railroad, reducing the time factor Confederate leaders counted on to mass their smaller, dispersed force. With the speed of the railroads, the dispersed nature of their forces, their ability to sustain larger armies than previously witnessed, and the inability to achieve a single decisive victory against the enemy created the inspiration for military leaders to think in terms of the operational level of war. The achievement of the campaign's objectives is not accomplished by the conduct of individual, isolated tactical engagements, but rather by the linkage of individual battles in terms of time and space to the operational level of war and the achievement of the strategic aim.⁴⁶

During the 1920s and 1930s, the development of operational art took on renewed importance within Russia as the concepts of deep battle, deep operations, and successive operations took on new meaning. While viewing the vast expanse within Russia, numerous Russian military leaders attempted to incorporate the lessons learned from previous wars, while applying the emerging technology to develop doctrine that was both feasible for Russia and capable of achieving their future war aims. General-Major A.A. Svechin, viewed by some as the

⁴⁵ James J. Schneider, *Operational Art and the Revolution in Warfare*, (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993), 5.

⁴⁶ Christopher R. Gabel, *Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Command and General Staff College, 1997), 7-8.

father of operational art, viewed it as a category between strategy and tactics. Operational art was the linkage between the tactical action and the commander's plan and the strategic aim of the operation. Differing from Clausewitz, Svechin did not envision one large decisive battle to annihilate the enemy force, but rather a series of operations to attrit and wear down an enemy force over time and space, eventually massing sufficient force to defeat him. In the era of industrialization, banking on one decisive blow against the enemy force could invite disaster if the latest action failed to destroy the enemy force. Full mobilization of the required strength would better achieve the strategic aim of the country and defeat an invading force. The concept of operational art came to fruition due to the need to plan successive operations throughout the depth of the battlefield.⁴⁷

Mikhail Tukhachevsky, another prominent general in the post-Tsarist Russia helped to develop the theories that eventually became operational art. Although having worked with Svechin for years, he developed a completely different view of modern war, in that a strategy of annihilation was viable, if the primary objective of the conflict was the complete destruction of the opposing enemy. Unlike Svechin, who proposed that a country should initially go on the defensive to absorb the offensive thrust of the enemy, finally destroying him through attrition; Tukhachevsky proposed an offensive war. The enemy's initial echelons would be destroyed before the opposing commander had the ability to bring to bear his deep reserves. The destruction of the troops and equipment of the enemy should be the objective of any military campaign.⁴⁸

N. Varfolomeev remarks while working at the Red Army Military Academy with Tukhachevsky in the 1920s best sums up the nature of the changing battlefield. Warfare had changed with the appearance of million-man armies and technological innovations altered the

⁴⁷ Jacob Kipp, "Two Views of Warsaw: The Russian Civil War and Soviet Operational Art, 1920-1932", edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, *Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 61-67.

time-space dimension of war. Military leaders had to develop solutions to the emerging command and control problems created by the displaced nature modern forces encompassed. These issues laid the foundations for operational art and the operational level of war.⁴⁹ As we enter the twenty-first century, these issues continue to dominate discussions concerning building campaign plans and the further development of operational art. In modern warfare, the time dimension has further decreased to days, hours, and minutes, further demanding commanders and planners think of sequential and simultaneous operations, vastly dispersed. The dominant situational awareness envisioned in future force developments will further create the need to define the critical elements of operational art that are required for future success.

When we think of operational art in the future and how the United States military envisions fighting the next conflict, we can look to ongoing changes within the services for examples of how full-spectrum, rapid-response capabilities have changed our thinking. The Army's development of the Objective Force and the Marine Corps's power projection concept *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* provide a vision for how the military services envision fighting the next conflict. The services, with an eye on the future, are determining the requirements to remain relevant as we seek to develop solutions for the innovative application of force.

The Interim Brigade Combat Team's Organization and Operational Concept stresses the need for the army to develop a military force that is strategically responsive, capable of faster integration into an emerging contingency in order to shape the environment, provide options, deter aggressors, reduce risk and facilitate a rapid decision. The full spectrum dominance envisioned by the leadership within the Army, created the vision for the development of a force

⁴⁸ Mikhail Tukhachevsky, "New Problems in Warfare", from *Art of War Colloquium*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: 1983), 17.

⁴⁹ Jacob Kipp, 70.

that had the deployability lacking in the mechanized and armor forces and the lethality and sustainability lacking within the lighter forces.⁵⁰

The power projection concept and the employment of force in the future will probably be vastly different from the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration outlined in FM 100-17-3. The vision of a phased operation where US forces assemble, stage, flow into theater, reassemble with equipment, and deploy to tactical assembly areas prior to combat has probably changed due to the many lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War. Enemies of the future will probably attempt to dictate the tempo and sequence of operations once US forces are in theater, preventing the US from seizing and maintaining the initiative. The contemporary operational environment envisioned stresses the fact that future adversaries will most likely lack the combat power to focus on the destruction of US forces but will rather focus on destroying key systems, eliminating US resolve, and rendering US combat power irrelevant by fighting in unconventional ways, while attempting to preserve their own combat power.⁵¹

Brigadier V.K. Nair, of the Indian Army, stresses numerous lessons learned from the Gulf War to developing countries as ways to attempt to thwart US military intervention in a particular theater. Any defeat inflicted upon the United States in the future would have to come in the form of asymmetric warfare, since a meeting engagement in the conventional, linear style manner would only result in a similar end state that Iraq received following their invasion into Kuwait. Countries lacking the ability to match the United States tank for tank, plane for plane, and ship for ship must look for means to counter that capability while still striving to achieve their strategic objectives. Nair suggests third world countries closely examine the vulnerability of the US logistic tail, striking it with special force type units, mining harbors to prevent the massive off-loading of supplies needed to sustain the conventional forces, and intercepting logistics

⁵⁰ *The Interim Brigade Combat Team: Organizational and Operational Concept*, v 4.0, 18 April 2000, 4.

⁵¹ Headquarters TRADOC, Threat Support Directorate of the TRADOC Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, FM 7-100.1 *OPFOR Operations, Draft*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Threat Support Directorate: 4 May 2001), 3-1 – 3-28. and *OPFOR Tactics*, 3-1 – 3-29.

shipping. Attacking high payoff targets such as AWACs, J-STARs, attack helicopters, cargo planes, and logistics, would not knock out the United States, but would cause a delay to further operations. In addition, seizing the initiative and taking the fight to the US forces would be critical where the situation permitted. Third world countries, although never able to match the firepower of the United States, can seek high tech weapons such as long range cruise missiles and surface-to-ship missiles that are capable of inflicting massive damage and loss of life, possibly causing the United States to reevaluate their strategic aim and the associated cost – benefit analysis with that strategy.⁵² In essence, adversaries of tomorrow will attempt to negate the United States technology overmatch through the use of asymmetric means.

The key operational capabilities that the IBCT brings to the fight is its mobility, dismounted assault and close fight capabilities, enhanced situational understanding, lethality, holistic force protection and survivability, force effectiveness, and reach back. All of these capabilities provide another asset for the operational level commander to use as he attempts to shape the battlefield. Although designed primarily for small-scale contingencies in complex and urban terrain, the IBCT will have the capabilities of an early entry full-spectrum force, capable of shaping the area of operations for follow-on entry of heavier forces. Its capability to deploy rapidly and conduct decisive combat operations immediately after entering a theater provides options for the operational level commander as he attempts to rapidly contain, stabilize, or resolve emerging conflicts.⁵³ No longer is there a need for a lengthy RSOI period, but the potential now exists for rapid integration into joint operation and the subsequent attack on enemy decisive points, leading to an early culmination of the conflict. The mobility and enhanced situational understanding of the IBCT also enables the unit to operate in a noncontiguous area, dispersed

⁵² V.K. Nair, Brigadier, *War in the Gulf, Lessons for the Third World*, (New Delhi, India: Lancer International, 1991), 217-231.

⁵³ Michael Mehaffey, Colonel, "Vanguard of the Objective Force", *Military Review*, September – October 2000, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:2000), 7-10.

over great distances facilitating simultaneous actions instead of the phased linear operations fought during previous conflicts.

The United States Army is not alone in realizing how the complex operational environment has changed the way we will project power and conduct operations in the twenty-first century. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* is the Marine Corps's vision of how it perceives countering the threats facing the successful integration of sea power into the maneuver plan, the projection of sea forces afloat to shore, and the control of the littoral regions around the world. At the heart of this concept is how the Marine Corps plans to decisively defeat the enemy center of gravity, by attacking decisive points and imposing their will upon the enemy force. Again, many of the same concepts that were prevalent in the Army's IBCT concept, emerge within the Marine Corps's concept. Logistics and the build-up of forces have always limited initial action against enemy forces. This concept focuses on seizing the initiative immediately by reducing the logistics tail. Ship-to-shore movement will take less time, enabling the landing force to immediately seek combat on favorable terms.⁵⁴

While the time dimension in which the United States envisions becoming engaged in its next conflict is shrinking continually, the space dimension is growing. Commanders within all services are concerned about the employment of force and the speed in which it is effectively integrated into the plan to achieve the strategic objectives. Dictating the tempo of operations from the first battle through completion of the campaign is critical to keeping the enemy on the defensive, always attempting to react to our initial moves and never being able to effectively predict our next course of action. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* also seeks to capitalize on the integration of all joint and combined assets and the effective use of intelligence and deception operations in order to create options through the flexible use of the force.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Department of the Navy. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1996), V-9 – V-11.

⁵⁵ Ibid, V-11.

Both of these visions provide a means of rapidly entering a theater of operations and seizing the initiative immediately, preventing the enemy the ability to capture his operational and strategic objectives. Military leaders of tomorrow are going to have to understand fully the capabilities of these emerging concepts, as well as, the military capability of the enemy and how to best apply this force in a particular time and space. As the United States becomes more reliant on high tech weapons and sensors to find, track and strike at enemy forces, the enemy continually learns new and innovative ways to counter the technology overmatch the United States currently brings to a conflict. The Vietnamese countered the US superiority in firepower by dispersing their force, the Iraqis hid military assets in urban areas, and the Serbs developed effective camouflage and dispersal techniques that rendered much of the aerial bombing ineffective. The enemy has learned that victory is within reach if he can hold on and not lose, while the Americans loose their resolve if the conflict endures over a long period of time. Victory for the United States will only come when we deprive the enemy of the advantages he has sought, making the most of synergistic effects of our services, and dictating the tempo of the operations from the onset.⁵⁶

Webster's Dictionary defines art as "the power of performing certain actions especially as acquired by experience, study, or observation. Systematic application of knowledge or skill in effecting a desired result."⁵⁷ The systematic application of capabilities brought to the theater of operations by each service will enable the future commander to demonstrate his art on the battlefield. The artwork envisioned by the commander will result in part from the synergy created before the operation, through tough, realistic training, integrating all services into an effective joint force. The one dimensional approach to a conflict witnessed during the bombing of Kosovo in 1999 should stand as a reminder that no single service panacea truly exists, but

⁵⁶ Robert H. Scales, Jr., Major General, "Speed and Power: Primal Forces in the New American Style of War, *Future Warfare Anthology*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2000), 5-7.

⁵⁷ Webster's Third International Dictionary, (Springfield, Massachusetts: G and C Merriam Company, 1976), 122.

success can only be assured through the integration of all services. Operational flexibility creates dilemmas for the enemy that he cannot overcome unless he deviates substantially from his original goals, while it also creates opportunities friendly force can exploit.

Operational art will continue to evolve in the future and incorporate the emergence of new technologies that will change yet again how force is applied. The operational level of war provides a link between the strategic aims established by the National Security Council and the tactical level missions conducted by the individual soldiers and units on the ground. The operational level commanders must continue to design campaigns that link these levels of war together into one coherent vision for the operation.

Standing Joint Task Force Analysis

The best strategy is always to be strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point.

*Carl von Clausewitz in On War*⁵⁸

Within Joint Doctrine, the operational level of war links the strategic objectives of a campaign to the individual tactical battles and engagements. This level of war is the vital link that determines where in time and space and for what purpose resources are allocated. It also ensure the nesting of objectives from the lower echelons to the higher echelons, ensuring that the force applied is directed towards the enemy center of gravity and not towards an unrelated objective.⁵⁹ Potential adversaries are going to attempt to wrest the tactical and operational initiative away from the United States as we project forces to the theater of operation and prepare for combat. The critical test for United States and allied combat forces in the future will be their ability to apply operational art in order to maintain the initiative and dictate the tempo of operations, while creating synergy between available forces, in order to achieve the desired end state.

Synergy

Joint Publication 3-0 defines synergy as the ability to “integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents”.⁶⁰ In much the same way the railroad and telegraph provided freedom of action for the execution of simultaneous and sequential operations throughout the depth of the theater of operations during the American Civil War, the United States military operating as a cohesive joint force has an even greater capability to apply force at a decisive point in modern operations. The synergy described in Joint Vision 2020 is a result of a combination of tailored forces that are

⁵⁸ Clausewitz, 204.

⁵⁹ Joint Publication, 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, II-2.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, xi.

able to conduct rapid, sustained, and synchronized operations across all domains, while seeking to reduce the sources of friction.⁶¹

As we take this model of how the United States military envisions fighting a modern campaign and apply it to the previous operations mentioned, it is clear that synergy was lacking from the onset of operations. During OPERATION URGENT FURY, planners attempted to attack dispersed targets throughout the island and achieve a *coup de main* through the application of overwhelming force. Although victorious at the conclusion of the operation, OPERATION URGENT FURY never completely achieved synergy between the services. Each service (Marines, Army, and SOF) operated in separate zones due to their inability to communicate with each other and the fear of fratricide. The actions conducted by each service were essentially unrelated to the operations conducted by the other services, with none setting the conditions for sequential operations conducted by another force.

The definition of synergy implies that the commander is able to extract the maximum contribution from each force that deploys as part of the JTF and that each force contributes to the overall effectiveness of the higher headquarters. In the cases of JTF 120, the lack of critical staff members during the planning phase of the operation caused unnecessary problems and reduced the effectiveness of certain units. For example, Special Operations Force missions are supposed to be clandestine in nature and planned using a high degree of detailed intelligence concerning the enemy force and their operational environment. Not designed for a conventional fight, but rather for a surgical strike against an operational or strategic target, these forces are ill prepared for conventional, long duration conflict against an armored force.⁶² OPERATION URGENT FURY overlooked many of the unique contributions that the Special Forces units operating as part of JTF 120 in Grenada could have contributed and used them in a more conventional manner,

⁶¹ Joint Vision 2020, 6-11.

⁶² *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, (Fayetteville, North Carolina: Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, January 1998), 1-1 – 1-2.

starting with the daylight air assault against positions vicinity Richmond Hill prison and then forcing them to fight a conventional fight against enemy armored forces.⁶³

Integrating and synchronizing operations for a small-scale mission is no less critical than that for a larger scale operation. The ad hoc formation of JTF Guardian Assistance became even more ad hoc when the specified and trained USEUCOM augmentation cell failed to arrive with the appropriate personnel needed to plan and conduct the operation. The synergistic effect desired by the commander was degraded with the lack of appropriate personnel needed to conduct the interagency coordination between the JTF, the embassies in the area of operation, and other humanitarian relief agencies and non-governmental organizations operating as part of this relief effort. A better trained and integrated staff may have been more able to coordinate the considerable intelligence effort required to ascertain an accurate picture of the refugee crisis and the threat facing any ground force. The lack of continuity among members of the JTF staff resulted in wasted time during initial phases of the operation, conflicting guidance given from the JTF Commander and the development of courses of action that were not suitable for the mission.⁶⁴

Planning a one-dimensional approach to a conflict does not create options for a commander, but rather boxes him into a corner forcing him to surrender the initiative. Creating JTF Noble Anvil in the midst of a crisis and the mounting political pressure to keep casualties low, forced this headquarters down this one-dimensional path in planning for eventual hostilities. The Department of Defense Report to Congress concerning OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, states that the “execution of a phased air campaign was the best option for achieving our goals”.⁶⁵ United States military casualties were minimal throughout the operation, but this one-dimensional approach to the conflict probably extended the time needed to achieve the strategic aim of the campaign. Synergy applies force from multiple directions, integrating the capabilities that each

⁶³ Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, *Operation Urgent Fury*, III-6 – III-11.

⁶⁴ *Operation Guardian Assistance After Action Review*, 19-26.

force brings to bear. The previously established JTFs in this conflict focused solely on a cruise missile campaign and a more robust air campaign, neither sought to expand their options by developing a ground plan to supplement the air campaign. The air campaign, although probably reducing allied casualties, likely extended the time duration for the operation, causing greater damage to civilian infrastructure and greater civilian casualties.

Admiral Ellis makes the point that the lack of a ground threat created “safe havens” in which Serbian forces could hide, negating the effects of the precision munitions used by the Air Force. The lack of a JFLCC greatly inhibited the planning of the campaign and creating options for the commander, resulting in no branch or sequel plans developed. Although never committed to combat action, TF Hawk would have been a great asset to force the Serbian forces into the open. This force or a creditable ground force would have created dilemmas for the enemy, which would have caused him to react, instead of remaining hidden and prolonging the conflict.⁶⁶

The Joint Force Headquarters envisioned by USJFCOM attempts to tackle the recurring problem of the JTF not fully being prepared at the onset of a conflict. While joint experimentation is concerned about the development and assessment of new concepts, organizations and technologies, four key elements of future joint operations continually emerge: knowledge-centric, coherently joint, a networked force, and effects-based operations.⁶⁷ With the individual services developing forces and concepts that enable them to react quickly and decisively, no longer can the higher headquarters be an ad hoc organization that is not fully prepared to integrate and synchronize operations from the emergence of the crisis. A coherently joint force implies that each service brings substantial capabilities to the fight and incorporating key assets into an operation is more likely to bring success than failure.

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, Report to Congress, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report*,

⁶⁶ Admiral James O. Ellis, 8-11.

⁶⁷ Unified Vision 2001, Rapid Decisive Operations in 2007, Joint Concept Refinement Experiment, Quick Look Report, 3.

Operational maneuver from strategic distances and the Marine Corp's vision *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* imply that the next generation of forces available to a regional commander are going to have significantly different capabilities than those of previous generations and can strike rapidly, dictating the tempo from the onset. An imbedded JF HQ in the regional CINC staff that already understood the theater engagement plan and the overarching strategic objectives could better capitalize on these emerging concepts and apply the necessary force in a decisive manner. Staffed with the appropriate personnel from the individual component commands this SJTF would not encounter similar difficulties encountered by JTF 120 with the lack of a JFLCC to coordinate ground operations or those experienced by JTF Noble Anvil with the complete lack of planning for a ground offensive.

After examining the capabilities of the SJTF envisioned by USJFCOM, synergy would increase with the development of this JF HQs. A staff that is integrated from the onset of the crisis, understood the regional CINCs strategic objectives, and staffed with the appropriate personnel from all services could better integrate and synchronize operations across a dispersed battlefield.

Anticipation

Joint Publication 3-0 defines anticipation as the ability to “remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation”.⁶⁸ By the nature of its definition, anticipation implies that potential JTF headquarters understand the strategic plan, how the emerging crisis affects the regional stability, and would have the capability to react as needed. The examples of ad hoc JTFs used in this monograph lacked the ability to anticipate fully the needs of the higher headquarters due to the nature of their formation.

Leveraging the full capabilities of the United States military and other government agencies into an effective and efficient effects-based planning process comes from being capable

of anticipating the unique requirements of a particular situation and then applying the available resources throughout the battlespace to achieve a rapid decision.⁶⁹ The Rapid, Decisive Operations concept developed by the Joint Experimentation Directorate envisions the achievement of a rapid victory by setting the conditions allowing the United States military to attack throughout the depth of the battlefield, paralyzing the enemy, causing him to react constantly instead of dictating the flow of operations.

The ability to exploit opportunities as presented by the situation, implies that the headquarters in charge of the operation is organized, trained, and equipped to do so. Unfortunately, even with the development of SOPs, such as USEUCOM Directive 55-11, the allocation of trained personnel does not always happen as planned and may be too late to impact in the manner desired. JTF 120 initially lacked a JFLCC to coordinate the ground attack on Grenada, causing the use of very rudimentary steps to ensure the separation between the Army and Marines. JTF Noble Anvil again lacked critical personnel to assist in the development of branches to the base plan, resulting in the inability to project ground forces if needed in the future. In addition, the formation of JTF Noble Anvil just before the commencement of hostilities prevented the staff from developing their plan for the operation and forced them initially to use those plans developed by two JTFs no longer existing. Instead of anticipating events and potential targets, the staff of JTF Noble Anvil was reactionary during much of the initial phase of the campaign, often having to scramble to find targets for the following ATO.

One of the insights emerging from the completed USJFCOM experimentation is that the embedded JF HQs, due to their increased ability to react with greater speed and their involvement in the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan, have increased potential to deter conflicts or coerce adversaries without actual combat.⁷⁰ The involvement of this headquarters before the conflict

⁶⁸ JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, xi.

⁶⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, *Unified Vision 01*, (<http://www.acom.mil/About/experiments/uv01.htm>).

⁷⁰ Unified Vision 2001, *Rapid Decisive Operations in 2007*, 5.

provides the means for anticipating events and requirements in a manner that previously mentioned ad hoc JTFs failed to. Sun Tzu writes that “the best policy is to attack the enemy’s plans; the next best to disrupt his alliances, for to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting is the acme of skill”.⁷¹ The establishment of these standing headquarters, capable of anticipating the emerging crisis, while potentially defusing them before they evolve into major regional crises provides numerous options that were not previously available to the CINC as he attempts to maintain stability within his area of responsibility.

Timing and Tempo

The Napoleonic campaigns of the early nineteenth century demonstrate an example of the importance of a commander being capable of dictating the timing and tempo of operations, resulting in the development of favorable conditions being set for offensive operations. In 1805, with Allied governments planning the means to restore the territorial integrity of the European continent, Napoleon again seized the initiative and managed another significant victory. With his forces marching eastward along the Danube, Napoleon sought a fight on his terms, by dictating the timing and tempo of operations in the vicinity of the town of Ulm. The outcome of this bold operation was the complete destruction of one enemy force and the other never possessing the means to enter the fight and influence the outcome of the operation. The ability to capitalize on a window of opportunity afforded by failure of the Austrians to make the proper allowance between their calendar and that of the Russians, afforded Napoleon the means in which to mass his forces at a particular time and place, preventing the dispersed allies the ability to react with sufficient force to counter.⁷²

In Chapter Nine, of Clausewitz’s *On War*, he identifies two critical principles that underlie strategic planning at the time: concentration of forces and the ability to act with the

⁷¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 9.

⁷² David C. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1966), 381-402.

utmost speed. The whole purpose behind these principles was to ensure that the allocation of sufficient forces to strike against the decisive points and center of gravity is not wasted against periphery and often, inconsequential attacks.⁷³ Modern day operations rely on the same basic principles.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States built a military force to stand against the forces of the Warsaw Pact, while it retained the capacity to respond to contingencies such as Korea, Vietnam, and later Desert Storm. Forward deployed military forces acted as both a deterrent and provided the ability to respond rapidly to a developing contingency. During the 1990s, the United States focused on preserving the capability to win two major regional conflicts, while maintaining the capacity for smaller conflicts such as Bosnia or Kosovo. The 21st Century will be entirely different, since there is yet no single contingency that will dominate our military focus, but rather many potential crises that loom on the horizon ranging across the full spectrum of conflict.⁷⁴ With the majority of our forces now CONUS based, the ability to foresee a developing crisis and rapidly react and deploy will often provide the best means of defusing the situation. The emergence of this broad set of potential new crises has added an additional requirement for transformation throughout the military. Realizing that speed is important, the ability to project force early into a theater of operation can make the difference between success and failure and provide a wider range of options for the President, Secretary of Defense, or the CINC.

Joint Publication 3-0 defines timing and tempo as the ability to “conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy”.⁷⁵ The emergence of regional hegemonic powers such as China, India, Pakistan, coupled with rogue states potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, advanced technologies and the

⁷³ Clausewitz, 617-624.

⁷⁴ Dennis C. Blair, Admiral, *Change is Possible and Imperative*, (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, Vol. 127, Issue 5), 46.

⁷⁵ Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, xi.

willingness to use them in asymmetric means creates complex situations for the United States to counter. As with all situations, the United States will seek to set the conditions in which to enter the theater at a point and place of our choosing, while maximizing the synergistic capabilities of our forces to dictate the tempo of future operations. A slower paced operation may play into the hands of an adversary not forced to project force to the theater, providing the means for him to further set the conditions for his success.

Potential adversaries in the future will continue to adapt to our capabilities in order to provide them the means in which to dictate the timing and tempo of operations. While seeking to achieve their objectives before the United States and its allies can respond, they will attempt to present a situation that is unfavorable and likely to produce a prolonged, indecisive operation.⁷⁶ According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, “The United States cannot take six months to respond to aggression as it did when Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait.”⁷⁷ Anticipating the crisis and dictating the tempo of operations prevents the enemy force from achieving their desired results. Future military action will likely seek to be rapid and decisive, seeking a quick solution in order to maintain the regional stability. The past JTFs examined did manage to stand up rapidly but all experienced significant difficulties during the early stages of the operations. Deterring a potential adversary into not choosing a particular course of action requires visibility. As the Secretary of Defense goes on to explain in another article, “If you want an effective deterrent, and if you want the ability to – in the event deterrence fails – do something in a reasonable period of time, you’d best be stood up and visible before the fact”.⁷⁸

JTF Noble Anvil, one of the more recent JTFs established by the United States military, operated in much the same way previous ad hoc JTFs operated. Established on the eve of the

⁷⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, J9 Joint Futures Lab. *A Concept For Rapid Decisive Operations*, 9 August 2001, 4.

⁷⁷ Agency Group 09, *DOD Looking to Develop Deployable Joint Command and Control*, FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, 17 July 2001, 1-3.

⁷⁸ Jim Garamone, *DOD Looking to Develop Deployable Joint Command and Control*, (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2001/n07172001_2001107172.html, 19 July 2001), 1-2.

conflict, none of the examined JTFs possessed any deterrent effect described by the Secretary of Defense. All of the JTFs examined stood up rapidly, but at what price? The lack of specific staff members, completed courses of action, and the ability to tie into other agencies limited the effectiveness during the initial stages of the conflict. The Rapid Decisive Operations concept envisioned by USJFCOM essentially means getting to the trouble spot quickly, with the right capabilities to make a difference and provide options for the higher-level commanders.

Across the military, forces stand poised, ready to deploy quickly and integrate into a contingency. Ready Force Battalions and Immediate Ready Companies are packed and assembled on airfields within different MACOMs prepared to deploy anywhere within eighteen hours. Yet at the same time, their higher headquarters, a potential JTF, may not be established until N+3 and not receive all of their augmentation until N+5 – N+7.⁷⁹ In reality, forces could actually deploy to a contingency faster than the higher headquarters could stand up and develop a plan. On the reverse end of the spectrum, the JF HQs envisioned by USJFCOM would have the JTF staff imbedded in the planning process from the onset of the contingency, completely prepared with the appropriate personnel to implement a plan that met the requirements of the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan.

⁷⁹ USEUCOM Directive 55-11, B-1.

Summary and Conclusions

The overall goal of transformation ...is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.

*Joint Vision 2020*⁸⁰

Modern campaigns, such as OPERATION DESERT STORM conducted by the United States and its allies; nineteenth century campaigns conducted by Napoleon in Europe; or the ancient campaigns conducted by the Romans or the Mongols have all sought to apply an asymmetrical advantage to the battlefield. The great captains have continuously struggled to find an advantage possessed by their forces and developed ways in which to leverage that advantage against an opponent. Lightning campaigns such as OPERATION DESERT STORM, were the result of the application of asymmetrical advantages such as: superior mobility, speed, intelligence, synchronization, and training of friendly forces. These advantages and superior technology shocked opponents and often led to the rapid conclusion of the conflict.⁸¹ As the United States enters the twenty-first century as the lone superpower, it must develop ways in which to harness the tremendous capabilities the joint forces bring to a confrontation and apply those joint capabilities in a manner consistent with the characteristics of operational art. The asymmetrical advantages currently enjoyed by the United States over potential adversaries must focus on placing him in a reactionary mode, while creating too many dilemmas for him to deal with at a particular time and space.

September 11, 2001 significantly changed the way America views the world. With the attacks on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon, the post-Cold War era ended violently and was replaced by an era of uncertainty. The forces of terror that had previously operated on distant shores now brought their violence home to Americans with the killing of innocent civilians within the borders of the United States. This single act of violence, along with the emergence of other

⁸⁰ Joint Vision 2020, 1.

⁸¹ Metz, 23.

regional powers and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has set the stage for the future operational environment; with it comes the military requirement to possess the capability to respond rapidly and decisively.

With the need to respond rapidly and decisively to worldwide contingencies, the United States can no longer afford a system within the military that is essentially unprepared for action at the onset of each crisis. The ad hoc JTFs previously examined lacked the inherent capabilities demanded in modern crises, with rapidly unfolding situations, taking place in obscure areas around the world. All three of the examined JTFs lacked critical personnel needed to plan courses of action during the initial phases of the operation, causing problems during the execution phases. The one-dimensional approach to the crisis in Kosovo was reminiscent of the singular focus LANTCOM had before OPERATION URGENT FURY. Humanitarian aid operations, as well as other stability and support operations also require a command and control system in place to enable a rapid and effective response.

The United States Joint Forces Command experimentation into the development of a standing Joint Force Headquarters has taken into account the capabilities required within joint headquarters and has begun to develop the means to ensure they are capable of meeting those demands. Trained personnel, knowledgeable in the area of responsibility, and integrated into the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan provide the means to respond more rapidly than previously examined Joint Task Forces. Integrated from the start of the crisis action planning allows this standing Joint Force headquarters the means to execute operational art in a way previously established ad hoc JTFs were unable to. The synergistic effect created by the integration and synchronization of forces into an effective joint force, the ability to anticipate the developing crisis and the impact it has on the region, and the ability to dictate the timing and tempo of operations creates an asymmetrical advantage over an opponent that has been used to the slower, more deliberate, and calculated American response during past crises.

My recommendations for the structure of the future JF HQs focus on ensuring it possess the capabilities previously lacking within the ad hoc JTF structure. First, the headquarters would focus around a core staff with the additional personnel previously battle rostered to operate as part of the augmentation plug used in numerous theaters. This staff, headed by a general officer, would consist of personnel from all services and operate as part of the CINC's staff during peacetime. Integrated into the daily operations of each regional command with a full understanding of the Theater Engagement Plan would provide substantial advantages over the outside headquarters identified as possible JTF HQs. Although the six headquarters identified by USEUCOM are fully capable of operating as a JTF within a reasonable time and with considerable augmentation, none provide the capacity that a SJTF would provide.

This SJTF staff designed with the appropriate personnel, knowledgeable in both joint operations and the specific region provides options for the CINC should the situation require a rapid and decisive response. This JTF staff may also provide options for the CINC should he establish multiple JOAs and need multiple JTF staffs to coordinate actions within each region. Another key asset that this structure brings to the CINC is the flexibility to deploy independently or as part of a larger JTF staff. A SJTF must be capable of conducting smaller scale contingencies such as stability and support type operations. It should possess the capability to integrate rapid reaction forces such as a Division Ready Brigade from the Army or a MEU from the Marine Corps and conduct these operations independently without outside augmentation. Larger scale contingencies such as those currently taking place in Afghanistan may require this headquarters to augment another staff from a larger unit such as a Corps or MEF. Either example provides options to the CINC as he responds to emerging crises within his theater.

My next recommendation is that USJFCOM continues to conduct yearly training exercises similar to those currently planned. Initial exercises such as Millennium Challenge 2002 and Olympic Challenge 2004 should further develop and refine the capabilities needed within these headquarters to meet the CINCs' requirements for a trained and deployable JF HQs. These

trained staffs have the advantage of developing standard operating procedures for integrating into the CINCs staff and other agencies such as embassies within their AOR. Following the refinement of the JF HQs concept, follow-on exercises should focus on ensuring the JF HQs maintains the ability to operate independently or as part of a larger JTF staff. Previous examples of ad hoc JTFs experienced problems coordinating operations and integrating into the CINCs plan. This trained staff would possess the ability to immediately participate in the crisis-action planning taking place in an emerging contingency.

My third recommendation is to ensure that the newly established JTF is deployable. Not only does it need the appropriate personnel but it also needs the appropriate equipment and C2 platforms to ensure they are capable of planning, synchronizing, and executing the assigned mission. In addition, it needs the means to sustain itself for a relatively short period, such as two weeks, until a support infrastructure is operational within the JOA. The United States currently has units on rapid deployable status in order to respond to emerging situations worldwide. Within the CINCs AOR, a THREATCON status would raise and lower the deployable status of the headquarters, making it capable of responding immediately if needed.

The ongoing operation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that despite tremendous efforts to build an effective joint force, the lack of a standing Joint Task Force has created dilemmas for the United States as opposed to the enemy. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has reiterated the need to establish this joint headquarters capable of rapidly responding to a crisis. The lack of this headquarters caused delays in the commencement of the initial information operations campaign in Afghanistan.⁸² The conduct of campaigns in the future may require a more rapid response, a standing JTF HQs provides the means in which to respond as rapidly as needed and attempt to seize the initiative from the enemy force. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review specifically addresses this need, “future military response will

⁸² Vince Crawley, “Joint task-force headquarters slow to get up to speed.” *Army Times* (December 3, 2001), 15.

require the rapid movement and integration of joint and combined forces... operations will demand a flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture".⁸³ The flexible, reliable headquarters envisioned is the Standing Joint Task Force headquarters.

⁸³ Donald R. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 35.

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